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MYSTICISM OR MEDIATION:
A RESPONSE TO GILL
Anthony N. Perovich, Jf.
Jerry H. Gill seeks 1 to clarify, reinforce, and extend some of the epistemological
claims of Steven Katz regarding mysticism;2 his most notable success, however,
consists in revealing the limitations of the position both he and Katz defend,
llimitations that lead at times to incoherence. The following discussion begins
with a preliminary statement of this incoherence, explaining how the use of the
concept of mediation pulls in two incompatible directions. I then treat Gill's
argument in detail to show more clearly why the "mediational" approach is at
odds with the respect for diversity that the approach is intended to encourage
and display. Weakening the notion of mediation, on the other hand, only succeeds
in frustrating the plan to undercut philosophically the idea of a philosophia
perennis, a goal which Katz's approach was primarily introduced to achieve.
Mediation, whether considered in the version of Katz and Gill or in a weakened
form, is simply too confining to produce the philosophical results alleged for it.
Finally, I show how Gill's insistence on the epistemological significance of the
non-conceptual (affective, behavioral, in short "bodily") aspects of human existence provides illuminating confirmation of the confined scope of his views.
Central to the position of both Katz and Gill is the claim that there are no
unmediated experiences; all experiences become available to us only as the result
of constitution through complex epistemological processes. 3 Katz employs this
thesis to argue for irreducible differences among mystical experiences arising in
different religious traditions.
A proper evaluation [writes Katz] of this fact [viz. that there are no
unmediated experiences] leads to the recognition that in order to understand mysticism it is not just a question of studying the reports of the
mystic after the experiential event but of acknowledging that the experience itself as well as the form in which it is reported is shaped by
concepts which the mystic brings to, and which shape his experience. 4
Because all experiences are of necessity contaminated with the conceptual scheme
brought to them by the subjects, and because the religions of the world equip
those subjects with a multitude of dissimilar schemes, we must (logically must,
as Gill has pointed out5 ) acknowledge variety rather than identity among the
mystical experiences of different traditions. Thus Katz characterizes his paper
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as a "plea for the recognition of differences."6
Gill, on the other hand, appeals to the mediated nature of experience in order
to limit rather than preserve diversity. The move occurs in the context of his
discussion of the properly Christian understanding of the idea of union with God.
Katz has attributed the absence of talk about union with God among Jewish
mystics and the presence of such language among Christian mystics in part to
the influence of Neoplatonism on Christian thought.7 Gill, anxious to ensure that
Christianity maintain a close relation with Hebrew rather than with Greek views,
exorcises the demon of Neoplatonic absorption through the invocation of mediation:
I am in agreement [he writes] that the Hebrew way of thinking is vastly
superior to that of Greek dualism, because it fits better with the general
character of religious experience and because it makes better Biblical
theology. A mediational view of religious experience-and thus a relational understanding of encounter with the divine--does negate the sort
of absorption or unity motif that is properly associated with the influence
of Neoplatonism. 8
Here Gill claims that the Neoplatonic doctrine of union with the One is incompatible with a mediational view of religious experience. Because all experience
must be mediated, it follows that Neoplatonic descriptions of unmediated union
are necessarily inaccurate, a fact Gill characterizes as a failure of "fit." This
development, however, plainly leads the standpoint to inconsistency: the principle
that maintains the mediated character of all experiences is used on the one hand
to justify the existence of a variety of types of mystical experience (including,
of course, the Neoplatonic sort9 ) and on the other to dismiss some of those types
from the realm of experiential possibility.
The source of the problem lies, of course, in the fact that Katz commits himself
not only to a "mediational" approach but also to a respect for the diversity of
types of mystical experience; in fact, he believes that mediation explains diversity,
as we have seen. The effect of Gill's remarks is to point out that Katz's method
of explaining variety limits that variety as well.
It is tempting to maintain that Gill has simply misunderstood Katz here. After
all, Gill's claim above that the Hebrew conceptual framework is more adequate
to "the general character of religious experience" than the Greek is wholly at
odds with Katz's respectful and even-handed approach to religious traditions,
above all because it falls into what Katz would consider the trap of supposing
that mystical experience has a general character which different traditions can
more or less adequately describe, instead of realizing that mystical experiences
have distinctive characters imposed by, and hence accurately describable in terms
of, the traditions themselves. In the light of this observation we may hesitate to
find the idea of mediation being properly employed in a limiting fashion and
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rather suppose, then, that when Katz claims that all experience is mediated, he
does not mean that only experiences of a relational nature are possible (as Gill
suggests); else how could he insist so strongly that unitive mystics do not misdescribe their experiences?1O
In the case at hand, however, Gill has perhaps a better insight into the consequences of a mediational approach than does Katz. The overall argument in Gill
proceeds from his understanding of the intentionality thesis through the claim
that all experience (including mystical) is mediated to the rejection of Neoplatonic
absorptive "experience" as not in keeping with the "general character of religious
experience," and the conceptual connections among these elements are, granting
the necessary assumptions, persuasively established. But what the argument
succeeds in demonstrating is merely how effective an approach based on the
mediated nature of all experience is in frustrating the unprejudiced study of a
central type of mystical experience.
Gill takes intentionality to be a necessary feature of human conciousness" and
bases on it the mediated character of all human experience. (Already there is
some bad question-begging at work in the argument, for the advocate of
unmediated mystical experience is precisely the one who also denies the intentionality of mystical consciousness: in such an experience the distinction between
subject and object breaks down.) The connection between intentionality and
mediation is the constructivism that he believes the former involves: "Our consciousness is always consciousness of some concrete aspect of the world, of
some particular aspect whose reality for us is constituted by our intentional
activity in relation to it. This intentionality is clearly a mediational factor which
undercuts the possibility of unmediated experience. "12 That there is an object of
experience at all is due to the fact that we do not passively perceive but actively
constitute it, and this activity introduces relational terms, such as the constructed
object and the constructing agent, and mediational elements, in so far as the
experienced object is known only via the constructive framework. To be related
involves distinction, as Gill makes clear in contrasting an absorptive union with
"a relational one in which individual persons remain distinct from one another
and interact with one another."13 To be mediated by a framework is, on the
Katzian assumptions accepted by Gill, to embody in a phenomenologically accessible manner the conceptual structure involved in that scheme: "the 'given' is
appropriated through acts which shape it into forms which we can make intelligible
to ourselves given our conceptual constitution."14
The rejection of unitive, absorptive mysticism follows directly from the relational, mediational character introduced by this intentionality, for the features
distinctive of that putative variety of mystical experience are precisely the absence
of (e.g. subject/object or interactive) relation and (e.g. conceptual) mediation.
Gill's view, in other words, holds that reality-as-we-are-conscious-of-it is constituted for us by our intentional activity, with the consequences that such reality
is necessarily mediated by (among other things) the conceptual structure involved
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in our intentional activity and necessarily stands in relation to us, hence never
absorbing us into itself.
While one may accept (as, in fact, I do) the interconnections among intentionality, mediation, and the rejection of unitive mysticism that Gill outlines, the
effect is merely to make explicit the limitations of the approach to mystical
experience advocated by Katz and him. For in his rejection of Neoplatonism as
not fitting the general character of religious experience, Gill (doubtless unwittingly) explodes the illusion that an especially advantageous feature of this
approach is its ability to handle the evidence. 15 Katz himself urges us to bear in
mind that,
Whatever the truth of the nature of the co-mingling of theory, experience
and interpretation that goes into the mystics' "report", the only evidence
one has to call upon to support one's analyses of this material, and
hence one's description of this relationship, is the given recording of
the mystic-the already "experienced" and "interpreted" first person
recording. 16
The unreconstructed testimony of the mystics, then, is the criterion against which
the adequacy of any interpretive approach is to be measured.
When we tum to the Neoplatonic sources, and to the Christian mystics most
deeply influenced by them, what does the evidence reveal? It reveals that the
experience (so far as we can tell from our only source, "the already 'experienced'
and 'interpreted' first person recording") is not intentional, not constituted through
and mediated by the imposition of a conceptual structure, not relational. Plotinus
makes these points clearly:
No longer can we wonder that the principle evoking such longing should
be utterly free from shape, even shape Intellectual. The very soul, once
it has conceived the straining love towards this, lays aside all the shape
it has taken, even to the Intellectual shape that has informed it. There
is no vision, no union, for those handling or acting by any thing other;
the soul must see before it neither evil nor good nor anything else, that
alone it may receive the Alone. 17
No doubt we should not speak of seeing; but we cannot help talking
in dualities, seen and seer, instead of, boldly, the achievement of unity.
In this seeing, we neither hold an object nor trace distinction; there is
no twO. 18
Moreover, whatever interpretive virtues there may be in Gill's attempt to separate
such views from the New Testament and "historical Christianity," such doctrines
certainly recur in prominent Christian mystics. No stronger statement rejecting
Gill's intentionality thesis could be desired than that in which Meister Eckhart
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criticizes misconceptions of union with God: "Some simple people think that
they will see God as if he were standing there and they here. It is not so. God
and I, we are one."19 Gill's "mediational" approach is inadequate to the sources
in an area where, as Katz himself points out, to be so inadequate is to fail as
an interpretive scheme.
Because Katz commits his position to a strong stand regarding the reliability
with which mystical texts indicate the character of their authors' experience, his
mediational approach suffers the same incoherence whether it faces the difficulty
of accommodating itself to certain mystical experiences, which was the situation
(;onsidered at the outset, or the problem of accommodating itself to certain
mystical reports, the situation just looked at. The incoherence results from trying
to remain faithful to the idea of mediation as well as to the full diversity of
mysticism, a diversity equally manifest on this view in the experiences proper
and in the reports that serve as our only evidence for their character. There are
only two ways to restore intelligibility to the account: either the claims regarding
diversity or the claims regarding mediation must be modified.
Gill adopts the former course by limiting the admissible types of mystical
experience, but we have seen that this course leads to failure. Katz's "plea for
the recognition of differences" claims to overlook no evidence 20 and thus to be
preferable to alternative accounts insofar as it puts one "in a position to respect
the richness of the experiential and conceptual data involved in this area of
concern. "21 An approach which sets itself such goals can only be severely embarrassed by its own inability to accommodate Neoplatonic absorptive experience.
Moreover, the modification of the claims regarding diversity in Gill is effected
by the insistence that all human experience (including mystical) is intentional,
relational, and mediated, and this view of experience is implausible in the extreme:
reports of mystical experience quite simply do not always manifest these characteristics. Such general claims about the nature of human experience seem quite
false when confronted with some of the best known and best documented sorts
of mystical experience.
The claims regarding mediation consequently must be modified, either by the
exemption of certain types of experience (notably the absorptive variety) from
subjection to mediation or by weakening the notion of mediation itself. The latter
approach might suggest that absorptive experience is due to the conceptual
background the mystic brings to it, although (and this is where the weakening
occurs) a phenomenologically accurate description of the experience itself does
not reveal this background (thus permitting the appearance of unmediated experience). In other words the experience would be mediated by the conceptual scheme
not in the sense that that scheme has shaped the experience itself (for if "shaping"
is to mean anything in these contexts then an accurate description should divulge
the scheme's workings) but rather in the sense that the scheme has provided a
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background by the possession of which the mystic is enabled to enjoy an experience of an absorptive variety. 22
Either of these modifications, however, will be accepted with equanimity by
the critic of Katz's and Gill's "mediational" approach. That such an approach
as a matter of fact is opposed to both suggestions is quite clear: excluding certain
types of experience from mediation violates the fundamental assumption that
there are no unmediated experiences, and admitting experiences which do not
reveal their conceptual background violates the claim, already noted,23 that all
experiences are shaped by the epistemological process in such a way that an
adequate phenomenological description will reveal the formative conceptual
framework.
There is a very good reason why the "mediational" approach manifests this
opposition to the suggested modifications, a reason that becomes clear when we
investigate the strategic role the approach is expected to play. An impartial reader
is struck by two shortcomings in the use of mediation by Gill and Katz: too little
diversity of mystical experience is generated as well as too much. Too little,
because, as we have seen in our discussion of Gill, certain central varieties of
mysticism seem to be excluded. Too much, because divergence of experience
among different traditions, a controversial result to say the least, is guaranteed
merely on the basis of unsubstantiated epistemological assumptions made at the
outset. 24
What I have characterized as the introduction of too great a diversity of mystical
experience by the account is viewed by Katz not as a shortcoming but as a virtue
of great strategic importance, for it is what permits him to eliminate the possibility
of identical experiences by mystics of different religious traditions. "There is no
philosophia perennis,"25 says Katz, and even the relatively sophisticated views
of Zaehner, Stace, and Smart, which recognize a variety of types of mystical
experience, "are unsatisfactory because they try to provide various cross-cultural
phenomenological accounts of mystical experience which are phenomenologically as well as philosophically suspect. "26 The philosophical suspicions are, of
course, based on the mediated nature of all experience; this factor requires, as
we have seen, that we recognize "a wide variety of mystical experiences which
are, at least in respect of some determinative aspects, culturally and ideologically
grounded."27 Katz's "plea for the recognition of differences" is, in fact, a plea
for the rejection of any version of a philosophia perennis, of any possibility of
an identity of mystical experience among subjects of different religious and
cultural backgrounds, and mediation is the philosophical tool for achieving the
necessary distinctiveness. 28
It is clear that abandoning (in certain cases) or weakening the notion of mediation in the fashion suggested above will permit the revival of the idea, at least,
of a philosophia perennis. For if the experience does not itself bear traces of
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the conceptual background, there can be no epistemological argument based on
mediation for the rejection of that idea. The framework in question may provide
a route to that experience, as the weakened version would suggest, but there is
no longer any reason to think it provides a unique route, any more than there is
reason to think that, because a Fregean sense offers a route to a referent, two
~,ense cannot offer different routes to one and the same referent. Only the conceptual traces in the experience itself permit Katz's one-to-one relations between
scheme and experience. Moreover, admitting experiences phenomenologically
free from conceptual taint would not only reintroduce the possibility of a
philosophia perennis but also require entirely rethinking the approach's facile
method of concluding a difference of experiential content from a difference of
conceptual content in the descriptions of mystical experiences. This method, the
primary basis for the claims of diversity and of the "conservatism" of mystical
experience, is undermined if the claim that the experience bears the structure of
the experiencer's conceptual framework is abandoned.
Katz and Gill are committed not only to the doctrine of mediation but also to
the goals of recognizing (and in fact explaining) the full variety of mystical
experience and of closing the door on any version of the perennial philosophy.
Unfortunately, our earlier discussion of Gill makes clear that mediation as Katz
and he understand it is incompatible with the first goal, and our present discussion
makes equally clear that any abandonment or weakening of the notion of mediation
so as to handle this difficulty makes achievement of the second goal impossible.
Since this latter (along with its basis, the conceptual shaping of experience) is
in every way central to the interest of the "mediational" approach, the proposed
abandonment or weakening has the effect of gutting the approach of philosophical
significance. This approach, far from being "extremely right-headed,"29 as Gill
would have it, is profoundly incoherent, and I see no way to make it both
intelligible and interesting.
If the comparative studies detailing similarities among the mystical experiences
occurring in diverse cultures and religious traditions deepen our suspicion that
mediation generates too great a diversity of experience, it is worth noting that
Gill's expressed desire to give "a more prominent place to the role of non-conceptual dimensions of human existence"3o by emphasizing the importance of the
body in' religious epistemology reconfirms our view that the approach limits
diversity as well, in this case by attempting to undercut the means thought
valuable for achieving those experiences we have seen his approach unable to
handle. Gill wants to overcome the need to view the encounter with the divine
as direct or unmediated by stressing the epistemological importance of the body:
once we recognize that the affective and behavioral dimensions of existence
mediate our experience, we shall be unlikely to characterize any of our experiences
as unmediated. 31 He traces the characterization of the encounter with the divine
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as direct or unmediated to a reaction to an overly intellectualized account of
cognitivity.32 While his account as it stands is hardly clear (is the characterization
due to the fact that cognitive encounters under a "narrow, intellectualist definition"
are necessarily indirect and mediated? why?), it seems plain enough that the
description of the encounter as unmediated is not to be traced to any such
implausible quasi-historical thesis but rather to the connection Neoplatonic
absorptive mysticism has established between forsaking the bodily and achieving
direct experience of God. To be sure, part of the Platonic tradition's neglect of
the body is due to the contempt expressed in the Phaedo, exemplified in its
claims that the body can only lead one astray in the search for truth, that the
senses merely distract. 33 This attitude receives its most perfect expression in
Porphyry's well-known report that Plotinus seemed ashamed of being in the
body.34 The chief motive behind the attempt to escape the bodily, however, lies
in the nature of the One (or of God , for those Christians writing in this Neoplatonic
tradition) and in the means that are in consequence required to achieve union
with It (or Him). The One transcends all multiplicity, and as the quotation above
from Plotinus makes clear, the soul that would achieve union must shed all that
is manifold in itself as well. Now both the senses and the intellect introduce
such elements of multiplicity and consequently both need to be renounced by
the Neoplatonic mystic; thus the Pseudo-Dionysius counsels Timothy to leave
behind the senses and the activities of the intellect in order to achieve union,
devoting separate chapters to the exposition of God's transcendence of the senses
and His transcendence of the intellect. 3s Given such a viewpoint, Gill's attempt
to connect embodiment with mediation appears as one more effort to rule out
certain sorts of mystical experience, hereby limiting the means of access.
Gill's discussion of intentionality developed along Kantian lines provides a
further (though, I believe, related) means of understanding the connection in the
Neoplatonic tradition of a scorn for the bodily with an emphasis on absorptive
union. Gill has suggested that intentionality involves a constructivist view of
experience. If developed in Kantian fashion such a view requires both a manifold
and a conceptual scheme that effects a unification of that manifold. In rejecting
the intentionality of mystical experience, the Neoplatonist rejects all those elements of ordinary experience which contribute to its intentional character, and
this involves abandoning not only the conceptual components of our experience
but the conceptualized ones as well. Even if we do not limit these latter to the
sensory and bodily, they surely include them;36 consequently we can understand,
on the one hand, why disparagement of the body has figured prominently in the
Neoplatonic search for union in non-intentional, non-relational, and unmediated
experience, and on the other, why Gill possesses a sound instinct when he seeks
to associate an emphasis on our embodied nature with an insistence on the
intentional character of experience. That we find in the whole Neoplatonic trad-
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ition a continual stress on the need to free oneself from the bodily element of
human existence further corroborates the claim that centrally included among
mystical experiences are those that are non-intentional and unmediated. And an
understanding of such experiences, like an unprejudiced look at the possibility
of a philosophia perennis, is necessarily closed to one who approaches mysticism
equipped solely with the intellectual tools of mediation.
Hope College
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